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Abstract
We study whether compensating people who volunteer to be leaders in a pub-
lic goods game creates a social crowding-out effect of moral motivation among
the others in the group. We report from an experiment with four treatments, where
the base treatment is a standard public goods game with simultaneous contribu-
tion decisions, while the three other treatments allowed participants to volunteer
to be an “early contributor” in their group. In the three leader treatments, we
manipulate the level of compensation given to the leader. Our main finding is
that a moderate compensation to the leader is highly beneficial, it increases the
average contribution by almost 80%. A high compensation, however, is detri-
mental to public good provision. We show that paying a moderate compensation
to the leaders strikes the right balance between the need for recruiting leaders
and avoiding a large social crowding-out effect. We argue that the main findings
of the paper are important in many real life settings where we would like to use
economic incentives to encourage people to lead by example.
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1 Introduction
The possibility to lead by example is potentially important in many public goods set-
tings. In the household, at the workplace, in the local community, in business and
politics, it is often possible for agents to take the lead and announce their contribution
to the public good before others do. Since many people are conditional contributors
in public goods contexts (Fischbacher and Ga¨chter, 2010), first movers can potentially
inspire others to contribute. But how can people be motivated to take the lead and
when is the strategy of leading by example likely to be effective?
Evidence from economic experiments with the public goods games suggest that
leading by example has the potential to increase the contributions by the followers
(Moxnes and van der Heijden, 2003; Arbak and Villeval, 2007; Haigner and Wakol-
binger, 2010; Rivas and Sutter, 2011).1 The same studies, however, also find that lead-
ers typically end up worse off than their followers, since followers tend to contribute
less than the leader. Thus, in contexts where it is a voluntary decision to become a
leader, one may face the challenge that no one steps up and makes the first move.
This problem is familiar in many real life settings. At the work place, everyone
may hesitate accepting to take the leading role in organizing valuable social activities,
fearing that their co-workers will not contribute to the same extent. Similarly, parents
may avoid taking the lead in organizing a school activity for the children, being afraid
that the other parents will not follow up. More generally, whenever there is the possi-
bility for taking the lead in a public good setting, people may hesitate to step up and
take the costs of making the first move.
The classical solution in economics to the problem of undersupply is to strengthen
economic incentives. It is by now, however, well recognised that the introduction of
economic incentives may undermine the intrinsic motivation of individuals, and the net
effect may be a reduction of the overall motivation and a reduction of the activity itself
(Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Fehr and Falk, 2002;
Be´nabou and Tirole, 2003). Thus, it is not obvious that offering leader compensation
would strengthen people’s willingness to volunteer as leaders, the economic incentive
may crowd out any intrinsic motivation to step forward. In the public goods context,
however, there is a further concern regarding the introduction of economic incentives
for the leader, it may crowd out the intrinsic motivation of the other members of the
group. We coin this the social crowding-out effect.
To study the effect of leader compensation we designed an experiment with a se-
quence of one-shot public goods games with random rematching. In addition to a
treatment without a leader, we had three treatments where the participants could vol-
1Leadership has many important aspects that are not investigated in the present paper, including
granting the leader the authority to reward or punish (Gu¨rerk, Irlenbusch, and Rokenbach (2009), Gu¨th,
Levati, Sutter, and van der Heijden (2007)), asymmetric payoff structures (Ga¨chter, Herrmann, and
Thoeni (2010),Glo¨ckner, Irlenbusch, Kube, Nicklisch, and Normann (2011), Levati, Sutter, and van der
Heijden (2007), van der Heijden and Moxnes (2013)) and asymmetric information (Potters, Sefton, and
Vesterlund (2007)).
2
unteer to be the leader whose contribution was announced before the other members
of the group decided on their contribution. The three treatments differed only in the
compensation given to the leader (zero, moderate and high). This design allows us to
study whether leader compensation represents a promising approach to public goods
provision in settings where it is possible for an agent to move before others, and allows
us to shed light on whether leader compensation creates a social crowding-out effect.
The paper offers three main findings. First, we show that leader compensation
indeed improves public good provision. Second, we find that the optimal strategy is to
pay leaders a moderate compensation. In this case, the average contribution increases
by almost 80% compared to the base treatment without a leader. A further increase
in the leader compensation causes a considerable drop in contributions, and turns out
to be the worst arrangement if the participants themselves have to cover the costs of
the leader compensation. Third, we show that a moderate compensation to the leaders
strikes the right balance between the need for recruiting leaders and avoiding a large
social crowding-out effect. Paying no compensation to the leaders appears to make
the followers even more responsive to the leader’s contribution, but fails to attract a
sufficient number of leaders. Paying a high compensation to the leaders, on the other
hand, appears to make it attractive to become the leader, but weaken’s the leader’s
ability to lead by example. In sum, the paper shows that leader compensation may be a
viable strategy for increasing public good provision, but also that it may initiate a social
crowding-out effect that makes it optimal to keep the compensation at a moderate level.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the experimental de-
sign, Section 3 reports treatment effects, Section 4 investigates potential mechanisms
through which leader compensation affects cooperation, and Section 5 provides some
concluding remarks.
2 The experiment
The experiment consisted of four treatments of a repeated public goods game with ran-
dom rematching. The base treatment was a standard public goods game with simulta-
neous contribution decisions, while the three other treatments allowed participants to
volunteer to be an “early contributor” in their group. Being an early contributor meant
that one’s contribution would be announced to the other group members before they
made their contribution decision. We shall in the following refer to the “early contrib-
utor” as the “leader”, though the word “leader” was never used in the experiment.
2.1 The participants and procedures
We recruited participants among students at the NHH Norwegian School of Eco-
nomics. A total of 272 subjects participated in ten sessions. Each session lasted
approximately 90 minutes and the average payment was 464 NOK (about 80 USD)
3
including a show up fee of 100 NOK. The experiment was conducted in a computer
lab using a web-based interface and was double blind.
Upon arrival the participants were informed about the rules of conduct, given an
overview of how the experiment would proceed and introduced to the general public
goods game. The participants were also informed that they would remain anonymous
throughout the experiment.2 Written copies of the instructions were available at the
participants’ desks. After the introduction, the participants were given a set of control
questions in order to ensure that they had understood the nature of the public goods
problem. All ten control questions had to be answered correctly before a participant
could proceed to the actual experiment.
All payments were made in cash immediately after the experiment. Special care
was taken so that the payment procedure ensured anonymity. The computer assigned
a payment code to each of the participants, and a group of assistants who were not
present in the lab during the experiment prepared envelopes containing the payments
corresponding to each payment code. After bringing the envelopes to the lab, the
assistants immediately left and the envelopes were handed out in accordance with the
payment codes. This procedure was explained to all participants at the start of the
experiment.
2.2 The treatments
All four treatments consisted of ten rounds of a public goods game with random re-
matching of groups after each period. The participants were randomly assigned to
groups of four and in each round they received 20 points (1 point = 1 NOK) that they
either could keep to themselves or invest in a public good. Each participant’s return
from the public good was 0.4 times the group’s total investment in the public good.
After each round the participants were informed about their payoff in this round and
their group’s total/average contribution.
Our base treatment (B-treatment) was a standard public goods game where all
group members simultaneously chose their contribution to the public good. This treat-
ment was a replication of the experiment presented in Fischbacher and Ga¨chter (2010).
In the three leadership treatments the participants could volunteer to be the leader. If
more than one group member volunteered, the leader was randomly chosen among the
volunteers and asked to state his contribution. The leader contribution was announced
to the three other group members before they decided on their contribution. If no
one volunteered to be the leader, the round was played with simultaneous contribu-
tion decisions. The only difference between the three leadership treatments was the
level of compensation given to the leader. In the “no compensation” treatment (NC-
treatment) the leader received no compensation.3 In the “medium compensation” treat-
ment (M-treatment) and the “high compensation” treatment (H-treatment), the leader
2The instructions and screenshots are provided in Appendix 2.
3The NC-treatment is related to the design in Rivas and Sutter (2011), who also study voluntary
leadership without compensation. The are two important differences between their study and our NC-
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received 4 and 12 points respectively to her private account as compensation for being
the leader. Importantly, the compensation given to the leader in the M-treatment and
the H-treatment did not change the pay off structure in the public goods game.
To summarize, a participant’s payoff in each round can be represented in the fol-
lowing way,
pii = 20− ci +0.4
4
∑
j=1
c j +di · ft , (1)
where ci is the contribution to the public good, di is a binary variable indicating
whether the participant was a leader and ft indicates the compensation paid to the
leader (which depended on the treatment).4
2.3 A conditional contribution experiment
After playing ten rounds of the public goods game, all participants took part in a second
experiment similar to the the P-experiment in Fischbacher and Ga¨chter (2010). In this
P-experiment, the participants first decided on how much they wanted to contribute
in a one-shot public goods game. The public goods game was the same as in the
base-treatment except that 1 point = 5 NOK. After deciding on the contribution in the
one-shot game, all participants were asked to fill out a conditional contribution table.
For each possible average contribution level of the three other participants (rounded to
whole integers), they were asked to specify how much they would want to contribute.
When all participants had made their decision, three of the four participants in a group
contributed according to their decision in the one-shot unconditional game, while the
contribution of the fourth participant (randomly drawn) was determined by his or her
conditional contribution table and the average of the three other participants. This
experiment provides us with an independent measure of the social preferences. In the
treatment; first, they consider a repeated game with partner matching, and second they let subjects go
ahead as leaders if they are quicker in entering a contribution than others. These differences may explain
why they find a stronger effect of voluntary leadership without compensation than what we observe in
the present study.
4Before making their contribution decision participants were also asked what they believed the other
participants would do. Leaders were asked what they believed the average contribution of the followers
would be given their own contribution. Followers were asked what they believed the average contri-
bution of the two other followers would be given the leader’s contribution. Participants in situations
without a leader were asked what they believed the average contribution of the three other participants
would be. The questions were incentivized and the participants received three points for a correct an-
swer, two points if their answer deviated with one point from the correct answer, and one point if the
answer deviated with two points. The beliefs data confirm almost exactly the analysis in Fischbacher
and Ga¨chter (2010), where it is shown that declining cooperation in a public goods game is driven by
people being imperfect conditional cooperators. We also find that the beliefs of followers about others
contribution are strongly correlated with the leader’s contribution. It is, however, not possible to identify
whether the underlying mechanism in this case is that the follower is inspired by the leader’s contribu-
tion and is prone to a false consensus effect, or that the follower is not himself inspired but believes that
others are so.
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following, we classify a participant as a freerider if he did not contribute at all in the
conditional contribution game, and as prosocial if he did contribute for some positive
contribution levels of the others in the group.
3 Results
We first present treatment effects on the contributions to the public good, before we
provide a brief discussion of whether it would pay off for the participants to compen-
sate leaders, if the group itself would have to cover the costs of compensation.
3.1 Treatment effects on contributions
Figure 1 presents how the contributions to the public good evolved in the experiment.
We observe that in all treatments, there is a declining trend in contributions in later
rounds. In the B-treatment, we replicate almost exactly the findings of Fischbacher
and Ga¨chter (2010), the average contribution is 37.3% of the endowment in the first
round, but falls to 12.5% of the endowment in the last round. The introduction of the
possibility of volunteering to be the leader without any compensation (NC-treatment)
increases slightly average contributions in the initial rounds, but this treatment falls
short of the B-treatment in almost all of the later rounds. In contrast, offering a leader
compensation increases average contributions relative to the B-treatment in all rounds
(with the exception of the last round for the H-compensation treatment). Finally, we
observe that the average contribution in the M-treatment is above the average contri-
bution in the H-treatment in all rounds (with the exception of the ninth round).
[ Figure 1 about here]
Figure 2 presents the treatment effects on the average contribution to the public
good across rounds.5 We observe that the introduction of a moderate compensation
to the leader substantially increases contributions, the average contribution in the M-
treatment is almost 80% higher than in the NC-treatment (p < 0.001).6 A further
increase in compensation is, however, detrimental for the public goods provision, the
average contribution in the H-treatment is significantly lower than in the M-treatment
(p = 0.048), but still higher than in the NC-treatment (p < 0.001). Finally, we observe
that the average contribution in the NC-treatment is slightly below the average contri-
bution in the B-treatment, but this difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.721).
5More detailed statistics are provided in Table A1 in Appendix 1. In the appendix, we also show
OLS-regressions on the treatment effects in Table A2 and disaggregated treatment effects for rounds 1-5
and 6-10 in Table A3. We observe the same pattern of treatment effects in the first and second part of
the experiment.
6Throughout the paper, reported p-values are from t-tests, where standard errors have been corrected
for clustering on individuals where appropriate.
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[ Figure 2 about here]
In sum, Figure 1 and Figure 2 provide three important insights. First, the introduc-
tion of leader compensation substantially increases contributions to the public good;
second, a too high leader compensation can be counterproductive; third, the reliance
on participants volunteering as leaders without receiving any compensation is not a
good strategy for securing public good provision.7
3.2 Does it pay off?
We end this section by briefly considering whether it pays off to compensate the lead-
ers. In the present experiment, the leaders were paid by the experimenter, but let us
consider whether it would have been profitable for the participants themselves if they
had to share the costs of paying the leader. Figure 3 shows the net value created for
the participants in each of the four treatments, where the net value is defined as the
difference between the income of the participant minus the endowment and the pay-
ment to leaders. We observe that the introduction of moderate compensation is highly
beneficial, it increases the net value by 38.3% compared to NC-treatment (p = 0.044).
In contrast, the net value generated in the H-treatment is very small and much lower
than in all the other treatments (p < 0.001).
[ Figure 3 about here]
4 Mechanisms
In this section, we investigate potential mechanisms through which leader compensa-
tion affects cooperation. We first look at how the level of leader compensation affects
the recruitment of leaders, before we discuss how it affects leader and follower behav-
ior.
4.1 Recruitment of leaders
As shown in the left panel in Figure 4, the level of compensation has a significant
positive effect on the participants’ willingness to be leaders.8 Only 22.1% of the par-
ticipants volunteer to be leaders in the NC-treatment, whereas 64.6% and 93.3% would
like to be the leader in the M-treatment and the H-treatment, respectively.9 As shown
7It should be noted, however, that voluntary leadership without compensation has been shown to
work in other settings, see Gu¨th et al. (2007); Rivas and Sutter (2011)
8In Figure A1 in Appendix 1, we report data disaggregated by round.
9Thus, in the present experiment, the economic incentive appears to be sufficiently strong to create a
positive net effect on the supply of leaders. This is consistent with the crowding-out literature (Gneezy
and Rustichini, 2000), which typically finds that a sufficiently strong economic incentive dominates a
crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation.
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in the right panel, this implies that in the treatments with leader compensation, there
is almost always a leader in the group (94.6% of the groups in M-treatment, 99.5% of
the groups in the H-treatment), whereas we only have leaders in 62.1% of the groups
in the NC-treatment.
[ Figure 4 about here]
The absence of a leader can clearly be detrimental for the group, since it may be
seen as a signal of no one being willing to contribute much to the public good. It is,
however, not straightforward to identify this effect, since followers in groups with a
leader may differ from followers in groups without a leader. However, if we focus
on the participants who never volunteered to be the leader, we have random assign-
ment into groups with and without leaders in any particular round and thus a clean
identification of the effect of having a leader. Regressing the follower’s contribution
on an indicator for the presence of a leader and controlling for round effects, we in-
deed find that the presence of a leader has a statistically significant positive effect: the
average contribution to the public good is about 20% higher in groups with a leader
(p = 0.055). We do not know whether this leader effect applies to the other partici-
pants in the sample, but at least it provides suggestive evidence of the importance of
ensuring that someone volunteers to be a leader in the group.
4.2 Leader behavior
We now turn to a discussion of how leader compensation affects leader behavior. As
shown in Figure 5, the average leader contribution is slightly lower in the H-treatment
than in the NC-treatment and, in fact, slightly higher in the M-treatment, but none
of these differences are statistically significant. What can explain the absence of a a
treatment effect on leader contribution?
[ Figure 5 about here]
The level of the leader compensation may affect both who volunteers to be leaders
and leader behavior.10 Importantly, a high compensation may attract more freeriders
to volunteer, as we indeed observe in Figure 6.11 But it may also generate a reciprocal
motive in the leader or change his beliefs about the extent to which the followers will
respond to his contribution. Overall, we observe from Figure 5 that the net effect on
leader behavior of manipulating the level of compensation is negligible in the present
experiment, we do not observe statistically signifcant differences in leader behavior
across treatments.
[ Figure 6 about here]
10See also ? and Arbak and Villeval (2007).
11We observe the same pattern if we consider the relative shares of freeriders and prosocial patterns
volunteering to be leaders, see Figure A3 in Appendix 1.
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4.3 Follower behavior
How do the followers respond to the leader’s contribution? Figure 7 reports the corre-
lation between the leader contribution and the followers contribution, and we observe
that it is very rare that the follower contributes with more than the leader (only in 7.2%
of the cases). The leader’s contribution appears to serve as a an upper ceiling for the
followers. We also observe a positive relationship between the leaders and follow-
ers contributions in all treatments; a higher contribution by the leader is, on average,
followed by a higher contribution by the followers.
[ Figure 7 about here]
Table 1 investigates the relationship between the leaders and followers contribu-
tions in more detail. The main coefficient of interest when comparing across treatments
is the linear combination of the leader contribution variable and the interaction variable
between the leader contribution variable and a dummy for whether the follower has not
experienced a situation without a leader.12 This coefficient captures the effect of the
leader’s contribution on the followers in the cases where the follower has not experi-
enced a situation without a leader. We observe that in these cases, the leaders ability to
lead by example is strongest in the NC-treatment and weakest in the H-treatment; an
additional unit of contribution by the leader is met with 0.45 units increase in the fol-
lower’s contribution in the NC-treatment, whereas it only generates an increase in the
follower’s contribution of 0.33 units in the H-treatment. Thus, the follower’s marginal
response to the leader is 36% higher in the NC-treatment than in the H-treatment, even
though the difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.161).13 The effect in the
M-treatment is between that of the NC-treatment and the H-treatment, and thus we
observe a pattern across treatments suggesting that increased compensation creates a
social crowding-out effect among the followers.
[ Table 1 about here]
The analysis of mechanisms suggests that the success of the M-treatment in gener-
ating high contributions is that a moderate compensation of the leaders strikes the right
balance between the need for recruiting leaders and avoiding a large social crowding-
out effect. Paying no compensation to the leaders appears to make the followers even
12We introduce this interaction term to allow for the possibility that having experienced no one vol-
unteering to be a leader may affect the willingness of the followers to respond to a leader’s contribution
in the future. We observe that this variable is positive and statistically significant (p = 0.024) in the
NC-treatment, which means that the leader’s contribution is more effective if the follower not yet has
experienced a situation without a leader. The interaction effect is also positive in the two other treatments
but not statistically significant (which is not surprising, given that we have very few groups without a
leader in the M-treatment and H-treatment).
13A related interesting result has been shown in van der Heijden and Moxnes (2013), who find that
followers follow the leaders more closely and make higher contributions when leading by example is
costly.
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more responsive to the leader’s contribution at the margin, but fails to attract a suffi-
cient number of leaders. Paying a high compensation to the leaders, on the other hand,
makes it even more attractive to become the leader, but weakens the leader’s ability to
lead by example.
5 Concluding remarks
We have shown that monetary compensation of leaders can be used to increase public
goods provision, but also that it may create a social crowding-out effect of moral mo-
tivation. We believe that these insights may be of great importance in a wide range of
real life situations.
It has been estimated that nearly a billion people are involved in voluntary work
throughout the world, and the voluntary sector has increasingly been recognised to
play a fundamental role in society, and particularly in the provision of public goods
(Salamon, Sokolowski, and Haddock, 2011). A crucial question in the organization
of voluntary work is how to motivate people to take the lead and inspire others to
follow. An example from daily life is the question of how to organize a youth soccer
team, which typically requires inputs from many parents. How shall we make sure
that someone is willing to take the responsibility of being the first mover in getting
the team established? The present paper has investigated one possibility, namely to
provide a monetary compensation to the leader of the team. Our experiment suggests
that such a compensation may be beneficial for the effort put into the organization of
the soccer team. It may make it more likely that someone steps up, and the presence of
a leader will most likely generate more effort from the other parents. But this strategy
must be implemented with care. A too high compensation to the leader of the team
may backfire, both by weakening the power of the example and by attracting the wrong
leaders.
Similar examples abounds in the public and the private sector. For example, how
should we think of monetary compensation to the department head at a university? A
high level of compensation will probably attract many candidates for the job (including
candidates with the wrong qualities), but it may also undermine the willingness of the
rest of the members in the department to contribute to the provision of public goods
in the department. The fact that the head of department works very hard to create a
well-functioning department may not inspire a similar effort from others, if they know
that he or she is highly compensated for taking the lead.
We find that compensating leaders involved in public goods provision may have
both positive and negative effects, and the relative importance of these effects may
depend on the level of compensation offered the leader. In particular, we have shown
that a high compensation to leaders may generate a large social crowding-out effect
of moral motivation that may be detrimental for public good provision. This finding
may also shed light on the present debate on CEO compensation, where we have seen
a surge in executive pay in the past 30 years. A main focus in this literature has been
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on whether CEO compensation motivates managers to make sound business decisions
(Frydman and Jenter, 2010), whereas the present paper points to the possibility that a
too high CEO compensation may crowd out the intrinsic motivation of other workers
in the firm. Further research, however, is needed to understand how these effects work
in different types of settings, where potentially also other aspects of leadership are
involved.
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Figure 1: Contributions
Note: The figure shows contributions over the 10 rounds for all the different treatments.
Both leaders and followers are included.
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Figure 2: Average contributions
Note: The bars show average contributions for the leadership treatments. The 95 per-
cent confidence intervals are also indicated. Note that all participants are included
(also leaders). The p-value when comparing moderate and high compensation is 0.047,
hence the difference is significant on a 5 percent level.
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Figure 3: Net value added
Note: The bars show the return on investment for the leadership treatments. The 95
percent confidence intervals are also indicated. Note that all participants are included
(also leaders). The net value added has been calculated as: Net value added = average
income - endowment - average leadership payment. The p-value when comparing
moderate compensation and base is 0.097. The p-value when comparing moderate
compensation and no compensation is 0.044.
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Figure 4: Recruitment
Note: The bars to the left show the share of participants volunteering for leadership in
the different treatments. The figure to the right shows the share of groups that had a
leader in the different treatments.
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Figure 5: Leader contributions
Note: The figure shows the contributions of leaders in the different treatments. The 95
percent confidence intervals are also indicated.
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Figure 6: Leader composition across treatments
Note: The figure shows the share of freeriders (classified by the P-experiment) that
volunteered for leadership in the different treatments.
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Figure 7: Follower contribution as a function of leader contribution
Note: The figure shows a scatter of follower contribution plotted against the leader’s
contribution for all leadership treatments separately and pooled. The line shows the
linear fit.
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Table 1: Follower motivation
Followers’ contribution
No comp Mod comp High comp
Leader contribution 0.253∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗ 0.298∗
(0.0603) (0.110) (0.163)
Always leader -1.485∗∗ -0.579 0.431
(0.666) (1.047) (0.904)
Leader always int 0.200∗∗ 0.104 0.0356
(0.0868) (0.122) (0.168)
Freerider -3.312∗∗∗ -5.050∗∗∗ -2.446∗∗∗
(0.755) (1.168) (0.907)
Period -0.269∗∗∗ -0.452∗∗∗ -0.415∗∗∗
(0.0984) (0.0990) (0.0726)
Constant 3.412∗∗∗ 5.931∗∗∗ 3.629∗∗∗
(0.869) (1.180) (1.055)
Leader lincom 0.453∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.060) (0.043)
N 354 405 627
R2 0.347 0.322 0.297
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (robust and clustered on participant level). The
model shows a regression of follower contribution on several explanatory variables
across the leadership treatments. “Leader contribution” is the contribution of the
leader in the participant’s group in this round. “Always leader” is a dummy taking
the value one if the participant in all previous rounds has been in a group with a
leader. “Leader always int” is an interaction between “Always leader” and “Leader
contribution.” “Freerider” = 1 if the participant gave all zeros in the conditional table.
“Leader lincom” is the linear combination of leader contribution and the interaction
term. Hence, “Leader lincom” should be read as the average marginal effect on a fol-
lower’s contribution from an increase in leader contribution in situations where the
followers always had encountered a leader.
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics
Average Contributions
All No leader Leader groups Leader Followers
Base treatment 4.21
(0.437)
N 560
No comp 4.00 1.56 5.49 10.22 3.92
(0.351) (0.216) (0.481) (1.128) (0.435)
N 760 288 472 118 354
Mod comp 7.15 2.90 7.30 10.61 6.2
(0.613) (1.215) (0.616) (0.979) (0.653)
N 560 20 540 135 405
High comp 5.70 6.25 5.70 9.69 4.37
(0.383) (3.259) (0.381) (0.670) (0.370)
N 840 4 836 209 627
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (robust and clustered on participant level).
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Table A2: Treatment effects - all rounds
Average contribution
No compensation -0.201
(0.561)
Moderate compensation 2.941∗∗∗
(0.754)
High compensation 1.496∗∗
(0.582)
Constant 4.205∗∗∗
(0.437)
N 2720
R2 0.035
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (robust and clustered on participant level).
The model shows a regression of a participant’s contribution on dummies for each
treatment with the base treatment as a reference.
Table A3: Treatment effects - periods 1-5 and 6-10
Average contribution
Period 1-5 Period 6-10
No compensation 0.460 -0.863∗
(0.743) (0.485)
Moderate compensation 3.004∗∗∗ 2.879∗∗∗
(0.835) (0.791)
High compensation 1.712∗∗ 1.280∗∗
(0.736) (0.556)
Constant 5.643∗∗∗ 2.768∗∗∗
(0.525) (0.421)
N 1360 1360
R2 0.026 0.059
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (robust and clustered on participant level).
The model shows a regression of a participant’s contribution on dummies for
each treatment for periods 1-5 and 6-10 separately with the base treatment as a
reference.
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Table A4: Effect of leader
Average contribution
Round -0.681∗∗∗
(0.0779)
Leader 1.237∗∗
(0.482)
Constant 5.339∗∗∗
(0.632)
N 406
R2 0.198
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (robust and clustered on participant level).
The model uses a subsample of followers: those who previously never has vol-
unteered for leadership in the experiment. The ”Leader”-variable is a dummy
which is equal to one if the group has a leader, and zero if not.
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Figure A1: Recruitment
Note: The figure shows the share of participants volunteering for leadership in
the different periods for each treatment.
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Figure A1: Leader composition across treatments
Note: The figure shows the share of freeriders that volunteered for leadership
in the different treatments. Participants were classified as freeriders if they in
the P-experiment chose never to contribute in the conditional contribution game.
Let nf and no be the number of freeriders and other regarding participants in
each treatment, respectively. Also let nlf and n
l
o be the number of freeriders and
other regarding participants volunteering to lead. The bars show
nlf/nf
nlo/no
for each
treatment.
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In this web-appendix we present the instructions that were read, instructions
on screen and the control questions used in the experiment. Please note that
text in brackets indicates comments to the procedure that were not read by the
session leaders.
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1 General introduction (all treatments)
Welcome. My name is ... and I will lead this session. The instructions will be
in English, since this is part of an international research project financed by the
Norwegian Research Council. Please please listen carefully to the instructions.
In this experiment you can, depending on the decisions you and others make,
earn more money in addition to the 100 NOK that you receive in show-up fee.
Your earnings will be added to your show-up fee and paid to you in cash at the
end of the session.
You are not allowed to communicate during the session. If you have questions,
please ask us. Violation of this rule will lead to the exclusion from the session
and all payments. If you have questions, please raise your hand. A member of
the research team will come to you and answer them in private.
You will be completely anonymous throughout the session, which means
that it will not be possible for the other participants - or us - to identify which
decisions you make. At the end of the session you will get a payment code on your
screen. You will be asked to write this code down on the sheet that is in the folder
next to you. You will show this sheet when you leave the session, and you will
then be handed over an envelope with the corresponding code, which contains the
money you have earned in the session. The research assistants who have prepared
the envelope will not be in the room when the envelopes are distributed, which
ensures that no one can identify how much each of you have earned in the session.
We will not speak of Norwegian kroner (NOK), but rather of points. Your
income will first be calculated in points. At the end of the session, the total
amount of points you earned will be converted to NOK, and you will be paid
accordingly.
An example:
We will now introduce you to an example, and we want to make sure that you
understand this example before we proceed. You will therefore be given some
control questions after the description of the example, and we will not proceed
before everyone has answered correctly all these questions. A copy of this example
is provided by the sheet named ”explanation sheet” , and you should now take
out this copy and follow carefully my description of the example.
[Leader waits until everyone has taken out the copy]
Assume that you are a member of a group consisting of 4 people. Each group
member has to decide on the allocation of 20 points. You can put these 20 points
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into your private account or you can invest them fully or partially into a project.
Each point you do not invest into the project, remains in your private account.
Your income from the private account:
You earn one point for each point you put into your private account.
For example, if you put 20 points into your private account (and therefore do not
invest into the project) your income amounts to exactly 20 points out of your
private account. If you put 6 points into your private account, your income from
this account is 6 points. No one except you earns something from your
private account.
Your income from the project:
Each group member will profit equally from the amount you invest into the
project. On the other hand, you also get a payoff from the other group members’
investments. The income from the project for each group member in this example
is determined as follows:
Income from the project = sum of all contributions x 0.4
If, for example, the sum of all contributions to the project is 60 points, then
you and the other members of your group each earn 60 x 0.4 = 24 points out of
the project. If four members of the group contribute a total of 10 points to the
project, you and the other members of your group each earn 10 x 0.4 = 4 points.
Total income:
Your total income is the sum of your income from your private account and
your income from the project:
Income from your private account (= 20 - contribution to the project)
+ Income from the project (=0.4 x sum of all contributions to the project)
= Total income in points
You should now move to the next screen to answer some control questions to
the example.
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1.1 Screenshot - control questions
Control questions:
Please answer the following control questions on the introductory example. They will help you
understand the situations that you will face later in the experiment. Please answer all the
questions and submit your answers.
Each group member has 20 points. Assume that none of the four group members
(including you) contributes anything to the project.
What is your total income? 1.
What is the total income of each of the other group members?2.
1.
Each group member has 20 points. You invest 20 points in the project. Each of the other
three members of the group also contributes 20 points to the project.
What is your total income? 1.
What is the total income of the other group members?2.
2.
Each group member has 20 points. The other 3 members contribute a total of 30 points to
the project.
What is your total income, if you - in addition to the 30 points - invest 0 points
into the project? 
1.
What is your total income, if you - in addition to the 30 points - invest 10
points into the project? 
2.
What is your total income, if you - in addition to the 30 points - invest 15
points into the project? 
3.
3.
Each group member has 20 points at his or her disposal. Assume that you invest 8 points
to the project.
What is your total income if the other group members - in addition to your 8
points - contribute 7 points in total to the project?
1.
What is your total income if the other group members - in addition to your 8
points - contribute 12 points in total to the project?
2.
What is your income if the other group members - in addition to your 8 points
- contribute 22 points in total to the project? 
3.
4.
Submit your answers
Copyright Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration.
http://192.168.10.51/mmin/understandingquestions/
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2 C-experiment
2.1 Base treatment - C-experiment
[Leader moves on when everyone has completed all
the questions]
Everyone has now answered correctly all the control questions. You will now
get a set of new instructions on the screen, please read them carefully.
[The following should not be read by Leader, only on
screen. A copy of the screenshot is provided on the next
page]
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2.1.1 Instructions on screen for base treatment
Instructions
You will now take part in an experiment that lasts 10 rounds.
In each round, you will be part of a group consisting of 4 participants. The group changes at
random after every round. So your group consists of different people in all 10 rounds.
Each member of the group has to decide how to use 20 points. You can put these 20 points into
your private account or you can invest them fully or partially into a project. Each point you do
not invest into the project is automatically placed into your private account. The conversion
rate is:
1 point = 1.00 NOK.
Your total income in a round is the sum of your income from your private account and your
income from the project:
Income from your private account (= 20 - your contribution to the project)
+ Income from the project (=0.4 x sum of all contributions to the project)
= Total income in points
In each round, you will be asked you to make two inputs.
First you have to decide on your contribution to the project in this round, that is, you
have to decide how many of the 20 points you want to contribute to the project and how
many points you want to put into your private account.
1.
Afterwards you have to estimate the average contribution to the project (rounded to
an integer) of other group members in this round (you will get more details later). You will
be paid for the accuracy of your estimate:
If your estimate is exactly right, you earn 3 points in addition to your other income
from the experiment.
If your estimate deviates by 1 point from the correct result, you earn 2 additional
points.
If your estimate deviates by 2 points from the correct result, you earn 1 additional
point.
If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the correct result, you do not earn
any additional points.
2.
You will have 90 seconds to fill in the decision screen in each round. If the time runs out you
will be given 90 more seconds, but 10 points will be subtracted from your account at the end of
the experiment.
After each round you will be informed about the contributions and earnings in your group in
this round. We will then randomly select a new group for you for the next round. When you
have completed all 10 rounds, you will be asked to wait until you get further instructions on the
screen.
When you have completed reading these instructions, please move to the next screen. You will
here be asked to wait until everyone is ready to move to the first decision screen.
I have read the instructions
Copyright Department of Economics, Norwegian School of Economics and Business
Administration.
Instructions http://192.168.10.51/mmin/instructionsC/
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[Leader moves on when everyone has read the instruc-
tions]
Everyone has now read the instructions, and we will therefore move to the
first decision screen. Keep in mind that your group consists of different people
in all 10 rounds. The instructions you have already read is also provided to you
by the sheet you have next to you named ”Instructions”. Please follow carefully
your screen.
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2.2 No compensation treatment - C-experiment
[Leader moves on when everyone has completed all
the questions]
Everyone has now answered correctly all the control questions. You will now
get a set of new instructions on the screen, please read them carefully.
[The following should not be read by Leader, only on
screen. A copy of the screenshot is provided on the next
page]
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2.2.1 Instructions on screen for no compensation treatment
Instructions
You will now take part in an experiment that lasts 10 rounds.
In each round, you will be part of a group consisting of 4 participants. The group changes at
random after every round. So your group consists of different people in all 10 rounds.
Each member of the group has to decide how to use 20 points. You can put these 20 points into
your private account or you can invest them fully or partially into a project. Each point you do
not invest into the project is automatically placed into your private account. The conversion
rate is:
1 point = 1.00 NOK.
At the beginning of each round, all members of the group will be asked whether they want to
be the early contributor of their group in this round. The early contributor makes his or her
choice of contribution before the others, and the choice of the early contributor is
announced to the three other members of the group before they make their decision of
how much to contribute. In all other ways, the situation is identical to the example presented
in the introduction.
You have 60 seconds to answer whether you want to be the early contributor of your group. If
the time runs out you will be given 60 more seconds, but 10 points will be subtracted from your
account at the end of the experiment. If more than one person wants to be the early contributor
in the group, the computer selects one of them randomly. If no one wants to be an early
contributor, then there is no early contributor in the group. In this case, all four members of
the group will make their decision at the same time.
Your total income in a round is the sum of your income from your private account and your
income from the project:
Income from your private account (= 20 - your contribution to the project)
+ Income from the project (=0.4 x sum of all contributions to the project)
= Total income in points
In each round, you will be asked to make two inputs.
First you have to decide on your contribution to the project in this round, that is, you
have to decide how many of the 20 points you want to contribute to the project and how
many points you want to put into your private account.
1.
Afterwards you have to estimate the average contribution to the project (rounded to
an integer) of other group members in this round (you will get more details later). You will
be paid for the accuracy of your estimate:
If your estimate is exactly right, you earn 3 points in addition to your other income
from the experiment.
If your estimate deviates by 1 point from the correct result, you earn 2 additional
points.
If your estimate deviates by 2 points from the correct result, you earn 1 additional
point.
If your estimate deviates by 3 or more points from the correct result, you do not earn
any additional points.
2.
You will have 90 seconds to fill in the decision screen in each round. If the time runs out you
will be given 90 more seconds, but 10 points will be subtracted from your account at the end of
the experiment. If someone else is an early contributor in your group, then we will post
his or her contribution on your contribution decision screen. Hence, you will know his
or her contribution before you make your own decision.
Instructions http://192.168.10.51/mmin/instructionsC/
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[Leader moves on when everyone has read the instruc-
tions]
Everyone has now read the instructions, and we will therefore move to the
first decision screen. Keep in mind that your group consists of different people
in all 10 rounds. The instructions you have already read is also provided to you
by the sheet you have next to you named ”Instructions”. Please follow carefully
your screen.
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2.3 Moderate compensation treatment - C-experiment
[Leader moves on when everyone has completed all
the questions]
Everyone has now answered correctly all the control questions. You will now
get a set of new instructions on the screen, please read them carefully.
[The following should not be read by Leader, only on
screen. A copy of the screenshot is provided on the next
page]
51
2.3.1 Instructions on screen for moderate compensation treatment
Instructions
You will now take part in an experiment that lasts 10 rounds.
In each round, you will be part of a group consisting of 4 participants. The group changes at
random after every round. So your group consists of different people in all 10 rounds.
Each member of the group has to decide how to use 20 points. You can put these 20 points into
your private account or you can invest them fully or partially into a project. Each point you do
not invest into the project is automatically placed into your private account. The conversion
rate is:
1 point = 1.00 NOK.
At the beginning of each round, all members of the group will be asked whether they want to
be the early contributor of their group in this round. The early contributor makes his or her
choice of contribution before the others, and the choice of the early contributor is
announced to the three other members of the group before they make their decision of
how much to contribute. The early contributor will be paid 4 points in addition to what he or
she earns from the private and public account. In all other ways, the situation is identical to the
example presented in the introduction.
You have 60 seconds to answer whether you want to be the early contributor of your group. If
the time runs out you will be given 60 more seconds, but 10 points will be subtracted from your
account at the end of the experiment. If more than one person wants to be the early contributor
in the group, the computer selects one of them randomly. If no one wants to be an early
contributor, then there will be no early contributor in the group. In this case, all four members
of the group will make their decision at the same time.
If you are a late contributor your total income in a round is the sum of your income from your
private account and your income from the project:
Income from your private account (= 20 - your contribution to the project)
+ Income from the project (=0.4 x sum of all contributions to the project)
= Total income in points
If you are an early contributor your total income in a round is the sum of your income from
your private account, your income from the project and the additional payment given to the
early contributor:
Income from your private account (= 20 - your contribution to the project)
+ Income from the project (=0.4 x sum of all contributions to the project)
+ Payment for being an early contributor (=4)
= Total income in points
In each round, you will be asked to make two inputs.
First you have to decide on your contribution to the project in this round, that is, you
have to decide how many of the 20 points you want to contribute to the project and how
many points you want to put into your private account.
1.
Afterwards you have to estimate the average contribution to the project (rounded to
an integer) of other group members in this round (you will get more details later). You will
be paid for the accuracy of your estimate:
If your estimate is exactly right, you earn 3 points in addition to your other income
from the experiment.
If your estimate deviates by 1 point from the correct result, you earn 2 additional
points.
2.
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[Leader moves on when everyone has read the instruc-
tions]
Everyone has now read the instructions, and we will therefore move to the
first decision screen. Keep in mind that your group consists of different people
in all 10 rounds. The instructions you have already read is also provided to you
by the sheet you have next to you named ”Instructions”. Please follow carefully
your screen.
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2.4 High compensation treatment - C-experiment
[Leader moves on when everyone has completed all
the questions]
Everyone has now answered correctly all the control questions. You will now
get a set of new instructions on the screen, please read them carefully.
[The following should not be read by Leader, only on
screen. A copy of the screenshot is provided on the next
page]
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2.4.1 Instructions on screen for high compensation treatment
Instructions
You will now take part in an experiment that lasts 10 rounds.
In each round, you will be part of a group consisting of 4 participants. The group changes at
random after every round. So your group consists of different people in all 10 rounds.
Each member of the group has to decide how to use 20 points. You can put these 20 points into
your private account or you can invest them fully or partially into a project. Each point you do
not invest into the project is automatically placed into your private account. The conversion
rate is:
1 point = 1.00 NOK.
At the beginning of each round, all members of the group will be asked whether they want to
be the early contributor of their group in this round. The early contributor makes his or her
choice of contribution before the others, and the choice of the early contributor is
announced to the three other members of the group before they make their decision of
how much to contribute. The early contributor will be paid 12 points in addition to what he
or she earns from the private and public account. In all other ways, the situation is identical to
the example presented in the introduction.
You have 60 seconds to answer whether you want to be the early contributor of your group. If
the time runs out you will be given 60 more seconds, but 10 points will be subtracted from your
account at the end of the experiment. If more than one person wants to be the early contributor
in the group, the computer selects one of them randomly. If no one wants to be an early
contributor, then there will be no early contributor in the group. In this case, all four members
of the group will make their decision at the same time.
If you are a late contributor your total income in a round is the sum of your income from your
private account and your income from the project:
Income from your private account (= 20 - your contribution to the project)
+ Income from the project (=0.4 x sum of all contributions to the project)
= Total income in points
If you are an early contributor your total income in a round is the sum of your income from
your private account, your income from the project and the additional payment given to the
early contributor:
Income from your private account (= 20 - your contribution to the project)
+ Income from the project (=0.4 x sum of all contributions to the project)
+ Payment for being an early contributor (=12)
= Total income in points
In each round, you will be asked to make two inputs.
First you have to decide on your contribution to the project in this round, that is, you
have to decide how many of the 20 points you want to contribute to the project and how
many points you want to put into your private account.
1.
Afterwards you have to estimate the average contribution to the project (rounded to
an integer) of other group members in this round (you will get more details later). You will
be paid for the accuracy of your estimate:
If your estimate is exactly right, you earn 3 points in addition to your other income
from the experiment.
If your estimate deviates by 1 point from the correct result, you earn 2 additional
points.
2.
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[Leader moves on when everyone has read the instruc-
tions]
Everyone has now read the instructions, and we will therefore move to the
first decision screen. Keep in mind that your group consists of different people
in all 10 rounds. The instructions you have already read is also provided to you
by the sheet you have next to you named ”Instructions”. Please follow carefully
your screen.
3 P-experiment
[Leader moves on when everyone has completed the
C-experiment]
We will now conduct another experiment, please follow carefully the instruc-
tions on the screen.
[The following should not be read by Leader, only on
screen. A copy of the screenshot is provided on the next
page]
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3.1 Instructions on screen to P-experiment
Instructions
This experiment will only be conducted once and is the last experiment in the session.
You will be asked to make a decision in a situation identical to the example presented in the
introduction. Your group consists of 4 participants, and the formation of groups is random.
Each member of the group has to decide how to use 20 points. Each point you do not invest into
the project is automatically placed in your private account. The conversion rate is:
The conversion rate in this experiment:
1 point = 5.00 NOK.
Your total income in this experiment is the sum of your income from your private account and
that from the project:
Income from your private account (= 20 - contribution to the project)
+ Income from the project (=0.4 x sum of all contributions to the project)
= Total income in points
Each subject has to make two types of decisions in this experiment, which we refer to below as
the "unconditional contribution" and the "contribution table".
Unconditional contribution: Your first task will be to decide how many of the 20 points
you want to invest into the project when you have no information about the contributions
of the other group members.
1.
Contribution table: Your second task is to fill in a "contribution table" where you
indicate how many points you want to contribute to the project for each possible
average contribution of the other group members (rounded to the nearest integer). To
illustrate, consider the table below, which will be presented to you in the experiment.
2.
The numbers in the table are the possible (rounded) average contributions of the other group
members to the project. You simply have to insert how many points you will contribute to the
project into each input box. You have to make an entry into each input box. For example, you
will have to indicate how much you contribute to the project if the others contribute 0 points to
the project, how much you contribute if the others contribute 1, 2, or 3 points, etc. You can
insert any integer numbers from 0 to 20 in each input box. Once you have made an entry in
each input box, click "OK".
After all participants of the experiment have made an unconditional contribution and have filled
in their contribution table, the computer randomly selects one of the group members. The
contribution table will be the payoff-relevant decision for the randomly selected member, the
unconditional contribution will be the payoff-relevant decision for the other three group
members. You obviously do not know whether the random mechanism will select you when you
Instructions http://192.168.10.51/mmin/level50/
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[Leader moves on when everyone has completed read-
ing the instructions]
Everyone has now read the instructions, and we will therefore move to the
decision screen. The instructions you have already read is also provided to you by
the sheet you have next to you named ”Instructions”. Please follow carefully your
screen. When you have made your decisions, please wait for further instructions.
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4 Closing remarks (all treatments)
[Leader moves on when everyone has completed the
P-experiment]
Everyone has now completed the second experiment. We should now like to
ask you a few questions before we present the payment screen that shows how
much you have earned in the experiment.
The earnings consist of: your income from the first experiment (including your
income from your correct estimates) + your income from the second experiment
= total income from both experiments + 100 NOK show up fee.
There will also be a payment code on the payment screen. As soon as the
envelopes with payment have been brought into the lab, we will start the payment
process. On request, show the payment code to my colleague and he will hand
you the envelope with this code. This envelop contains your earnings. Please
remain seated until we read your payment code.
Since we will conduct further sessions today, please do not talk to anyone
about the experiment before tomorrow.
You can now start answering the questions and then move to the payment
screen. This part ends the session. On behalf of the research group, I should like
to thank you for your participation.
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